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Introduction
This paper investigates the determinants of mergers among Prussian miners' social-insurance funds between 1861 and 1920. The so-called Knappschaften, the miners' mutual insurance funds, provided compulsory insurance on a pay-as-you-go basis. The insurance contract obligated each miner to make a regular contribution to his fund, and, in return, he would receive insurance benefits conditional on the occurrence of particular events. Knappschaften (henceforth abbreviated with KVs for German Knappschaftsvereine) were to insure against sickness, injuries, invalidity, survivorship, and-implicitly-old age. The corresponding benefit package included income-replacement benefits, such as sick pay and pensions, and in-kind benefits such as medical treatment.
Focusing on the formative period of the German welfare state, this investigation is motivated by an important stylized fact: Starting in the 1870s, absolute and relative concentration among KVs steadily increased. The underlying concentration process was not driven just by unequal internal growth, but by liquidations and mergers in particular. Aside from the fact that we can observe this wave of external growth among those pioneers of social insurance, the decision-making process itself-involving miners, their employers, the state, as well as contemporary observers as external opinion makers-is still pretty much a black box.
Contemporary observers and the recent economic literature suggest two well-known motives for insurance mergers during the period this paper studies. On the one hand, mergers might have been conducted to take financial pressure off KVs. Some KVs were struggling due to the structural decline of the mining area, to which they were tied, and due to businesscycle fluctuations or actuarial disadvantages, such as being too small or lacking actuarial expertise. Both facts, it is surmised, eventually drove the KVs and their insurants to financial disaster. I call this the 'rescue hypothesis.' From this perspective, mergers were conducted in order to stabilize the job-related insurance scheme in Prussian mining as a whole. This could have worked only if at least one of the following conditions was fulfilled: (i) Miners and mine owners, who, together, self-managed their KVs, felt highly responsible for their fellow KVs and unanimously considered it an act of solidarity to help financially distressed KVs; and (ii) the mining administration, hence the industry regulator, forced mergers on KVs according to its own aims and regardless of whether or not miners and mine owners agreed. On the other hand, mergers might have been conducted simply because the absorbing KV aimed to seek growth opportunities and advantages-for example, in the form of cost reductions by improving one's own actuarial fundamentals. I call this the 'self-interest' hypothesis. Here, solidarity is not required. Rather, the regulator would have been required to tolerate any merger con-5 ducted or refused. A third hypothesis, however, might be that mergers, and maybe even liquidations, were the consequence of accidental, ad-hoc decisions rather than planned and conscious action.
In order to open the black box of mergers among KVs, this investigation combines a qualitative analysis of contemporary economic arguments for mergers and statistical evidence on the determinants of the concentration process. The basic assumption of this paper that external growth was due mainly to an economic rationale seems to be justified for two reasons.
First, this view dominates the contemporary literature on KVs. Second, source material on board meetings, which would directly indicate whether decisions to merge or to liquidate were done for non-economic reasons, is currently unavailable. Accordingly, the analysis is done in four consecutive steps: First, data sources are explained. Second, in order to convey an impression of the basic economic and social conditions under which KVs operated, the German mining industry's development is briefly reviewed and linked with an overview of the KVs. Third, contemporary arguments for mergers and concentration are evaluated. Fourth, an empirical survival model, based on Fine and Gray's (1999) competing risk approach, is presented, yielding additional statistical insights.
Most contemporary sources convey the impression that KVs were merged to stabilize the entire insurance scheme by sorting out actuarially unviable and financially distressed funds. In contrast, statistical evidence suggests that the KVs were absorbed over time primarily because they offered advantages to the absorbing KVs and, hence, were quite attractive targets. This contradicts the rescue hypothesis and the idea of cross-KV solidarity.
Data sources
This analysis draws mainly on the Statistik der Knappschaftsvereine des preussischen Staates, henceforth referred to as KV statistics. The Prussian ministry of trade and commerce compiled and published these statistics starting in 1854, reporting data for 1852. 1 Beginning in 1862, annual data were published regularly, with each year's publication reporting information on the preceding year. For the years 1921 and 1922, information is not available. In 1923, all German KVs merged into the Reichsknappschaft. What the ministry of trade and commerce actually compiled and published were the official reports of the KVs, which they were obliged to send to the ministry. Thus, miners and mine owners, who together operated their
KVs, relied on a pool of quantitative information addressing past experience. In particular, the extent of quantitative material on one's own past experience grew from year to year. Data 6 cover the entire population of 103 Prussian KVs operating within the period 1861-1920 and provide a broad range of information on memberships, revenues and expenditures. 2 Information on mergers and liquidations within the observation period are taken from Jopp (2010) , who provides a basic overview of the 20 mergers (name of involved KVs, their location, year of merger, size, pensioners-to-contributors ratio in the year prior to the merger, and, as appropriate, the name of the newly created KV). In particular, Jopp distinguishes two types of mergers. The former (type A) was the more frequent and happened when one or more KVs were merged into another fund that had existed before the merger and continued to exist afterwards. 3 The latter (type B) happened when two or more KVs merged to create a new fund.
German mining and the Knappschaften -an overview
By the middle of the 1850s, German miners could already look back at 600 years of experience with mutuality in risk provision. Almost from the start, mine owners were part of the system as sponsors. As a consequence of the Knappschaft law of 1854, both miners and their employers entered into a new era, one of 'social insurance'. KVs pioneered the field of organizing social insurance against the contingencies of life, the consequences of which everyone feared, and no one could shoulder on his own. There is no doubt that mining, especially deep mining for coal, was among the most perilous occupations connected with a high ex ante probability of becoming involved in accidents and suffering from severe chronic diseases (e.g., silicosis) or epidemics (e.g., hookworm). The key reason for these health issues was the lack of safety measures and hygiene, issues that were put on the agenda only little by little.
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Since KVs were an integral part of the German mining industry, their business policy and the economic and social challenges they faced can only be understood against the background of the industry's secular trends and peculiarities. Thus, some general contextualization seems to be in order.
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Industry structure and administrative units
German mining might, at first, be associated with coal, and particularly hard coal. In the nineteenth century, hard coal certainly became the single most important natural resource, and most miners-hence most KV members-were engaged in extracting it. However, extractive activities concentrated on a number of resources, diverse in their properties and, thus, in their challenges for the production process. In the following, I refer to these various resources as 'subsectors' of the mining sector. According to German national statistics, we can identify the following subsectors: (i) hard coal, (ii) brown coal, (iii) iron ore, (iv) miscellaneous ores, (v) halite, (vi) salts, (vii) pyrite, and (viii) the rest. In addition to those figures, crude death rates also suggest that mining was extremely hazardous. Table 3 reports, on the one hand, the number of deaths among 1,000 active KV members per subsector and, on the other hand, the deaths per 1,000 in the German population.
This comparison is, of course, imperfect since national figures do include more than just the economically active male population. Nonetheless the rates give an indication of the comparatively high probability of death while working as a miner, as compared to the national aver- health and the ability to work, and, thus, the above-average need for income protection. However, there is no doubt that miners felt the need to jointly shoulder financial uncertainty due to erratic, immediate income losses resulting from sickness or injuries long before this study's observation period. Accordingly, miners benefited from several sources of income replacement right from the start of the KVs' history: (i) daily sick pay in the case of temporary sickness; (ii) medical treatment; (iii) lifetime invalidity pensions in the case of permanent incapacitation; and (iv) survivorship pensions in the case of the breadwinner's death. 25 Until the end of the sixteenth century, however, KVs came across as charitable organizations providing very moderate benefits in the case of need and so long as the cash box allowed. A legal right to receive benefits commensurate with contributions paid did not exist. When the absolutist-mercantilist regime emerged, charity was by patronage through the sovereign, who assured subsistence by providing the 'wage by mercy' (Gnadenlohn) in case of the inability to work.
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The reform of Prussian mining legislation between 1851 and 1865 then shaped the KVs' benefit scheme towards job-related insurance. KVs had already operated with compulsory membership and mandatory contributions to be paid by miners and mine owners. The
Knappschaft law of 1854 introduced, in addition, legal claims and, thus, some kind of actuarial relationship between contributions and benefits. 27 While miners and their employers were now free to manage the KVs, the mining administration, though it lost direct control over all aspects of the business, retained its supervisory role and still functioned as the industry regulator. KVs operated either a benefit scheme for a particular area (e.g., the Märkische Knappschaft in the Ruhr), and for which no other KV was allowed to compete, or for a particular mine, mining enterprise or steelworks (e.g., the Georgs-Marien-Hütte in the Ruhr). Thus, the action in Europe at the time, aiming especially to provide working people and their dependants with a kind ofoften occupation-or profession-specific-social safety net; i.e., the financial power of the KVs-increased by about 753 percent, whereas the number of pensioners to be financed increased at an even higher rate, implying an increasing financial burden put on the average contributor. However, while there were always more survivors than invalidity pensioners, invalids were far more costly, as columns (7) and (8) show. At the minimum, about 47 to 50 percent of pension expenditure was for invalidity pensions. 30 On the whole, aggregate expenditure data indicate a great expansion of social spending within theKVs' benefit scheme. This applies to all main claims categories, including sickness-related benefits. 31 Extensive growth was due, on the one hand, to the expansion of the workforce and, on the other hand, especially to the rising relative numbers of pensioners. Additionally, manyKVs increased per capita generosity, which led to intensive growth of expenditures. 32 Columns (4), (9) and (10) give an indication of the aggregate social significance of KVs compared to Bismarckian social insurance. While, in 1871, all Prussian KVs' insurants together amounted to 0.67 percent of the German population, they accounted for 2.17 percent in 1920.
In contrast, the coverage of Bismarckian health and invalidity insurance with 9.7 percent in 1871 and reaching about 22 percent by 1920.
In order to assess the concentration phenomenon-the focus of this investigation- 
(8) Table 2 ).
The net reduction in the number of KVs resulted from a large number of mergers and liquida- The concentration process that obviously took place in Prussian Knappschaft insurance was driven by a combination of internal and external growth of KVs. Clearly, if the coal or ore fields, for which a KV was responsible, experienced long-term prosperity, the KV did, too. If local or regional resource deposits, however, came near economic or technical exhaustion, production stagnated, and so did the KV. This is simply because mine owners would have reacted by adjusting production capacities-capital such as steam or electrical engines, other technical equipment, shafts, and workforce-downwards. It was definitely the labor input that could be cut most rapidly to reduce costs. Maybe with a time lag, a KV would have seen a steady decline in memberships, for the most part due to young recruits staying away, but also due to labor turnover into other KV areas. 
Mergers -a consequence of business policy or industry regulation?
According to the basic regulations of 1854 and 1865, the mining administration no longer ran the firms having had the true power on the managing boards. They were concerned that the firms were making decisions according to their own interests, thanks to Elders, who often elected representatives more friendly to employers than to their official principals. 37 Lauf recently stressed that the mine owners or salaried managers had a clear intellectual advantage over Elders, which gave them 'opinion-leadership.' 38 Besides, employers could credibly threaten to fire uncooperative elder miners (as long as they were active, of course) or to influence their loyalty to their boss by giving them some kind of administrative tasks in the KVs (control the sick, for example). 39 As Geyer argues, in order to understand KV business policy and who profited most from decisions, it is crucial to know who really ruled the KVs. 40 Based on the assumption that employers and employees indeed had different interests, the modes of social and economic interaction between miners, owner-managers or salaried managers, and the state as provider of the relevant regulatory framework, especially regarding conflict regulation, have attracted much scholarly attention. 41 The industrial relations historiography has one important implication for this paper: Conflicts of interest between miners and their employers existed about contractual issues, working conditions, safety issues and mine owners' paternalistic attitudes, and these conflicts deepened when miners increasingly formed organized opposition in trade unions. Therefore, these conflicts must also have been faced by the KV boards and must have influenced their decision-making process-at least to a certain extent.
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It is still unclear which role the different actors-the KV boards' members, the firms as the opinion leaders, the state as the regulator, and the external expertise of contemporary observers-played. It also remains unclear why one of the alternatives-(i) continuation of operation, (ii) merger or (iii) liquidation-was chosen in a particular period. This investigation explores whether economic, and especially actuarial, motives may be assumed. In general, the economic literature proposes a variety of motives to merge: to increase the market share, diversify risks, exploit economies of scale and scope, reach minimum efficient size, and to avoid insolvency. 43 On the one hand, as stated in the introduction, it may have been in the interest of a KV's management to view a merger as an insolvency alternative in case of financial distress. On the other hand, it might have been in the KV's interest to absorb another fund because there were opportunities to stabilize one's own growth and reduce one's own costs;
and members of the absorbed KV might or might not have profited.
From the opinion in the literature that, in the end, it was the firms that dominated KV boards, it follows that business policy is very likely to reflect mine owners' interests. What were their interests? In my view, their main interest was, indeed, economic at its corenamely, being able to maintain a workforce as healthy, as satisfied and as productive as possible at the lowest possible cost. Several findings in my statistical analysis will be quite in line with this view. Since employers' contributions to KVs were a true cost item-and more so after implementing additional labor costs due to co-financing Bismarckian insuranceemployers were arguably interested in keeping costs as moderate as possible. The point is that a KV entering into a state of financial difficulty for whatever reason-business-cycle fluctuations, structural decline, long-term demographic changes, or erratic expenditure shocks due to accidents-meant additional costs for firms. If, for example, the number of pensioners relative to contributors had risen, this inevitably would have required raising contributions, which firms also would have had to pay. Hence, it was in the economic interest of firms to operate a financially healthy KV. In fact, the contemporary discussion on actuarial deficiencies of KVs, which I summarize in the following subsection, gave the firms attractive arguments for how to improve a fund's financial soundness from an actuarial perspective.
Contemporary arguments in favor of mergers
During the nineteenth century, according to Borscheid, the financial innovation 'insurance' became more and more prevalent. Commercial voluntary insurance focused on life insurance, while compulsory social insurance addressed, in particular, the risks of sickness and invalidity. 44 Soon after 1854, when the 'era of social insurance' began for KVs, contemporaries started to discuss structural problems of those funds that were directly related to their role as insurance providers. This historical debate in the literature was, at its core, actuarial, and the main arguments were linked with the issue of KV size and the weaknesses of the pay-as-yougo method. Hence, focusing on the contemporary arguments in favor of mergers sheds some light on the available actuarial knowledge at the time.
Julius Hiltrop, for example, argued as early as 1869 that many KVs were, on the one hand, too small to ensure actuarial stability of their pension insurance scheme and, on the other hand, too large to successfully control for moral hazard in their health insurance scheme:
Of greatest importance for a KV's usefulness and efficiency, however, is its size. The more members a KV has, . . . the more solid will it become in . . . granting benefits and overcoming challenges. . . . . The basic evil rather is the preposterous fusion of health and pension insurance; a KV's size too large for it provider of health insurance and too small for it provider of pension insurance. 45 Others, like Albert Caron, Harry Karwehl, Heinrich Imbusch, and Ferdinand Bertrams, expressed similar thoughts; Karwehl, in particular, talked about high fragmentation-that is, the very unequal size distribution of KVs mentioned in the previous section-as the 'cancerous ulcer' of Knappschaft insurance. 46 Another contemporary, Peter Simons, suggested that larger KV areas, achievable by mergers, would result in a de-coupling of local, or even regional, economic growth or decline and a KV's financial state. This was because growing areas, where deposits were still rich, could cross-subsidize stagnating areas, where deposits were close to economic or technical exhaustion. 47 An industry regulator would very probably like this argument since it implies greater stability of the entire insurance scheme. Employers, as 21 well as miners, in a prospering mining area would very probably not have liked to see their prosperity being redistributed to stagnating areas.
Obviously, contemporaries believed that running a pension-benefit scheme required a minimum efficient size that was larger compared to the minimum efficient size of health insurance; we may define it as the size beyond which there were no economies 49 See, for example, Peter Albrecht, Gesetze der großen Zahlen und Ausgleich im Kollektiv -Bemerkungen zu Grundlagen der Versicherungsproduktion, in: Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft 71 (1982), 501-538. The law of large numbers in its empirical formulation says that the relative frequency of a particular event converges towards its true, but unknown, probability of occurrence, the more observations are included.
very long time period, so that perfect predictability of financial needs was achieved. This steady state, however, was claimed to require a large size and the law of large numbers coming into effect. 50 As a consequence of actuarial considerations, mergers of small KVs into larger ones, or even mergers of all KVs into one fund for Prussia or Germany as a whole, were repeatedly demanded. 51 In particular, it was postulated to separate pension from sickness insurance in order to allow for different fund sizes in the quite distinct insurance sections. Caron, for example, claimed:
Consequently, the first basic condition for a structural reform of Knappschaft insurance is to form sufficiently large Knappschaft areas so that the law of large numbers comes into effect. Thus it would be perfect to merge all Prussian KVs into one pension insurance fund. 52 Karwehl furthermore stated:
Further concentration is truly essential. Besides some other disadvantages for comrades arising from high fragmentation, small and smallest KVs are by far not able to accomplish their social tasks. 53 Besides considering KV size as a major issue, contemporaries also discussed the usefulness of the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) method, which KVs universally chose to finance expenditures.
In a PAYGO system, current health and pension expenditures in a given period are financed by revenues of the currently employed. KVs probably chose the PAYGO method because it enabled them to immediately pay out pensions without relying on the accumulation of reserves for each miner or each generation (birth cohort). Contemporaries were definitely aware of the sensitivity of the PAYGO method to long-term demographic changes or sudden financial shocks. However, they seem not to have considered the method formally, as something that could be depicted as an equation, but intuitively knew that rising numbers of pensioners per contributor or rising numbers of sick days per contributor necessarily required adjustments of the contribution rate and the gross pension level. Jopp shows that those adjustments widely led to diminishing implicit rates of return over time, hence postponing financing burdens arising from the increasing number of pensioners. In particular, it was the large KVs in the growing mining areas that could keep implicit rates by and large constant over time. 54 There is no evidence at all that contemporaries really thought about implicit rates of return. They did not even explicitly argue on the basis of the pensioners-to-contributors ratio's 23 (PCR) direct relation to the PAYGO equation. 55 and they thought that the 'golden way' to sustainability-i.e., to a situation in which every generation of miners would be treated equally-was to increase size and was to sort out unviable KVs.
The industry regulators' intentions
The mining administration as the industry regulator most likely shared the view that increasing the KVs' size by mergers was a useful strategy. In fact, the regulations of 1854 and 1865
did not say much on this topic, merely that a KV should be neither too small nor too large. 56 Prior to the reform of Knappschaft law in 1906, however, the administration exerted some verbal pressure. Hilt, for example, informs us about an attempt in 1870, essentially initialized by mining official Hermann Brassert, to merge all KVs in the region of Bonn into one pension fund; this attempt failed because most firms opposed the proposal. 57 Another attempt of the administration to clear its position regarding size and mergers was the ministerial decree of 1883, in which it reads:
It has been repeatedly stated that the fusion of small KVs among themselves or with a larger fund is the appropriate way to ensure efficiency. . . . 58 The administration concluded that, indeed, some mergers were done, but that they were by far insufficient. Yet, there is no evidence that, before 1906, the administration really forced mergers or liquidations upon KVs. There is only evidence that the verbal pressure increased.
The amending law of 1906, then, made it possible for the regulator to formally force mergers or closures upon KVs ( §177a and b). 59 Bertrams informed us that the liquidation of the St. Wendeler KV in 1906, for example, was a consequence of this new regulatory instrument. 60 On the whole, evidence does not suggest that mergers were a consequence of regulatory policy, but a result of business policy. Yet it remains quite unclear whether KVs that absorbed another one did so to help the absorbed KV out of an actuarial trap or to seek one's own growth opportunities, or to appeal to the regulator.
Merge or fail? An empirical model of mergers among Knappschaften
The previous section shed some light on the contemporaries' and the state's general position:
that a larger size is better than a smaller size, and that small KVs are to be merged into others.
Mine owners and the administrative staff, as providers of the general intellectual input for KV management, could definitely have had some actuarial knowledge. In order to extend the qualitative analysis on mergers quantitatively, a statistical model based on survival analysis will be presented in the following section. This model uses a set of explanatory variables on the KV-level to examine the probability with which a KV was either absorbed or liquidated, respectively, given that it had reached different points in time; see the Appendix for a brief description of the model.
Determinants of mergers and liquidations with explanatory potential
In the following, I briefly summarize the set of variables applied. Making a clear distinction between mergers and liquidations is important since the two modes of exit are not likely to be affected by covariates in the same way. Moreover, as was argued above, one basic businessrelated decision at any point in time was to decide whether to continue operation or to exit by merger or liquidation. By considering both modes of exit explicitly, this model goes beyond usual firm-survival models that merely consider exit per se as event.
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The aforementioned discussion of contemporaries' views centered on the claim that KV size matters and that many KVs had still not reached the appropriate size; merging funds was proposed as an effective measure to increase their size and to improve the actuarial underpinnings of small KVs. In this context, KV size is hypothesized to play a major role in explaining exit decisions. As shown above, the annual size distributions were extremely unequal, and many KVs were arguably too small to operate on a sound actuarial basis. In order to measure the importance of that consideration, I incorporate several controls with respect to gives an indication of structural change regarding the mining areas underlying the KVs' insurance. A negative average growth rate implies, by tendency, long-term shrinkage and, correspondingly, a positive-one long-term prosperity.
Furthermore, I employ several measures of financial distress according to the 'rescue hypothesis.' First, the invalids-to-contributors ratio (ICR) and the survivors-to-contributors ratio (SCR) measure the current burden with invalidity pensioners and with widows and orphans; these are the components of the pensioners-to-contributors ratio already introduced.
The burden from pensioners increased for many KVs, especially for the comparatively smaller ones and those subjected to long-term structural decline. Besides, inclusion of those ratios follows directly from the functioning of the pay-as-you-go mechanism, which the KVs applied. 63 Depending on the development of wages-hence productivity-the additional financing burden on contributors might, in the end, reduce disposable income and lifetime implicit rates of return. Second, the start-up ICR and the start-up SCR measure the initial burden from pensioners. In order to allow the effect of start-up size to vary with the initial burden from pensioners, I incorporate interactions of start-up size with the respective ratios. Third, analogous to the ICR and SCR, the sick-days-to-contributors ratio measures the financing burden on contributors that arose from the sickness insurance section. The more sick days the average contributor had to finance-caused by incentives for malingering, for example 64 -the greater the financial pressure on a KV.
A few more variables are incorporated in the model to capture part of the heterogeneity among KVs. One variable is the share of established contributors among all contributors. Established contributors were, in general, more costly than unestablished ones in that they often received higher benefits given equal contribution payments. Against the background of an increasing ICR or SCR, a decreasing share of established miners may release the KV from some financial pressure. Indeed, it may also indicate structural problems since ever fewer miners obviously had applied for established status, hence had not decided to enter into a long-term relationship with the KV. Following Guinnane and Streb, the firms' share in costs is included as well. 65 Furthermore, the young-to-old ratio equals the ratio between established contributors aged 16 to 35 and those aged 36 and older. This is a proxy measure for a KV's age structure. A continuously diminishing ratio can be interpreted as a hint at structural aging of the contributor base. Indeed, data from the KV statistics show that this ratio varied notably across KVs.
The diversification of a KV's membership across the different mining subsectors is measured by a Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) using subsector shares for each KV (e.g., the number of insurants employed in hard-coal mining divided by the number of all insurants;
see Table 1 ). If a KV insured miners who were employed in only one subsector, the HHI equals one. If insurants were equally distributed over all subsectors, the HHI equals 0.083.
Hence, the closer the HHI is to the latter quantity, the less concentrated are a KV's insurants in only one subsector. Contemporaries such as Harry Karwehl believed that the various subsectors reflected different degrees of occupational hazard, with hard-coal mining being the most hazardous activity. 66 A mixture of hazards might have been of actuarial advantage and might, presumably, have lowered dependency on the economic fate of only one subsector. In addition, I incorporate a variable intended to measure the potential of correlated risks. As mentioned above, mining was an economic activity with a high risk of massive accidents involving many insurants at the same time and, thereby, overwhelming a KV with many immediate sickness or invalidity claims. Clearly, mass accidents destroy the stochastic foundation of insurance because the risk that one miner claims sickness or invalidity is not independent of the risk that another miner had claimed so before; this is because both individual risks share the same origin (the accident). 67 I measure the potential for correlated risks on the KV level by dividing the average number of contributors per mine by all contributors. If a KV was responsible for exactly one mine, the ratio equals one, expressing that all miners could have been affected by an accident at the same time. The more mines a KV was responsible for, the 65 Guinnane/Streb, Moral hazard (cf. n. 49). 66 Karwehl, Entwicklung (cf. n. 45), 74. 67 From the perspective of an insurer, the risks that individuals sharing the same occupation make their claims seem, in general, to be correlated simply because the occupation brings about the same accident risks and diseases for everyone. 27 e).
smaller was the ratio and, hence, the lower was the potential for immediate financial disaster from correlated risks.
Finally, I include a variable that measures the business cycle to which KVs were subjected. The business cycle is measured in terms of the deviation of hard coal, brown coal, iron ore, zinc ore, lead ore or copper ore mined from trend production. Therefore, the trends of those production series between 1861 and 1920 have been estimated on the level of mining administration regions (the Oberbergamtsbezirke). 68 To each KV, I ascribe the trend deviation of the single most important product. I assume that steelworks were subjected to the regional iron-ore trend and that salt works and stone pits were subjected to the hard-coal trend (Dortmund) as well as the iron-ore trend (Bonn and Hall
Finally, explanatory variables were checked for multicollinearity by evaluating the pair-wise correlation coefficients across them. 69 As expected, there is a high correlation beyond 0.75 between the ICR and SCR, and the SCR and the sick-days-to-contributors ratio.
However, all variables measure different aspects and are, therefore, kept in the regressions. Table 7 As argued above, KV size played a major role in the contemporary discussion, especially as it motivated merger activity. Therefore, we expect to find size to be essential in explaining absorptions. In fact, current size does not play as essential a role as the insignificance of coefficient (10) Although current size does not explain mergers, conditions at the start, in 1861, did, indeed, matter. Start-up size has explanatory power in both models. Regarding absorptions, the model says that KVs that began with a high invalids-to-contributors-ratio and a small size-coefficient (4)-were more likely to be absorbed at any point in time than KVs with the same initial burden with invalids, but a higher KV size. 70 This finding has two implications:
Results
First, starting positions predetermined, to some extent, the funds' future survival process.
Second, the finding supports the 'rescue hypothesis.' Regarding liquidations, the effect of start-up size is significantly positive.
Let us focus now on the financial distress variables, the ICR and SCR. While the current ICR does not help to explain absorptions-in particular, not in the presence of the alternative 'liquidation'-the current SCR does. The positive sign of coefficient (8) implies that the higher the current burden with survivors was, the more likely a KV was to become a target for absorption. This finding also makes the case for rescue mergers that were motivated, in part, by the desire to protect survivors, who would have lost income in the case of liquidation.
Yet this finding does not explain why invalids were not statistically relevant for absorbing another KV. In the case that all potential targets were burdened to some extent with pensioners, it is possible that KVs targeted those with a less-costly survivor burden. Regarding the competing risk 'liquidation,' both the ICR and SCR as main financial distress variables have no significant explanatory power.
Another important variable-not the least because of the coefficients' magnitude in both cases-is the young-to-old ratio, which measures a KV's age structure. Indirectly, it measures the growth opportunities embedded in the respective mining area and, thus, how attractive it was for young people to enter the mining sector as new employees. With respect to absorptions, coefficient (11) implies that the likelihood of becoming a target for merger by absorption increased notably if the young-to-old ratio was high. This is consistent with the idea that a KV, interested in improving its own financial position by absorption, absorbed another fund only if it was really attractive. A relatively high number of young relative to old contributors must have been appealing to a KV, especially to the mine owners, because this is a signal of prosperity. If KV board members, including miners' and mine owners' representatives, were to ensure the future of their own fund, they had to ensure a steady future inflow of young insurants. This was definitely in the interest of mine owners, who wanted to seek opportunities to keep costs low and to avoid dealing with 'wounded' KVs. This view is supported by the finding on liquidations. If the ratio got worse and, hence, the number of young miners declined relative to the number of old ones, KVs were liquidated. That is to say, KVs that were obviously suffering from structural decline of the mining industry in their area were not attractive targets. This fact itself is straightforward. However, if the actors on the absorbing KVs' boards were of the same opinion as the contemporaries-namely that KVs in trouble were to be rescued-they did not draw the same conclusion, which was to perform corresponding rescue absorptions. The growth pattern variable, coefficient (6), points in the same direction.
The financing share of the firms, coefficient (13), implies that the higher the share was, the more likely a KV was to become a target of absorption. Board members of the absorbing KV, especially the mine owners, might have interpreted a rise in that cost share in one of two ways: On the one hand, they might have found that it also signaled prosperity in the respective 'targeted' mining area, which allowed the mine owners there to unburden insurants out of additional profits. Thus, it might have been attractive to incorporate those employers in one's own KV since they were obviously willing to contribute-or, at least, they were used to contributing-more. On the other hand, there is room to speculate about an alternative interpretation. A rise in the entrepreneurs' cost share could have also signaled growing financial distress, hence the opposite. Given that contributors were already sufficiently burdened with the financing of costs, entrepreneurs were under pressure to inject additional resources in order to prevent the KV from being underfunded. Accordingly, the absorption would not have been done because of an advantage for the absorbing KV, but would have been more of an insolvency-avoidance merger. I tend to interpret the coefficient as implying growth potential.
Finally, and not surprising, KVs were also more likely to be absorbed if they were diversified over at least two mining subsectors. This finding also supports the 'self-interest'
hypothesis. However, contrary to my expectation, a decreasing potential for correlation of individual risks-which is not an actuarial disadvantage at all-drove the probability of liquidation up, not down. This observation is somewhat counter-intuitive. One of the following explanations may apply: First, decision makers were simply not aware of those actuarial relationships, so they were not relevant to the decision. Second, such an actuarial advantage is worth nothing if a KV faced structural or actuarial problems. Hence, if, in practice, the potential for correlation of risks might have decreased, this alone was not helpful.
Conclusion
This Part of the findings supports the baseline hypothesis that mergers were a rescue measure.
KVs could have entered a state of financial distress right from the start of the insurance system in the middle of the 1850s or over the course of the subsequent years. Contemporaries linked financial distress of KVs with matters of size and the weakness of the PAYGO mechanism. Consequently, a solution to these problems, perceived to be of crucial importance for the long-term prospects of Knappschaft insurance, was commonly seen in mergers.
In addition, findings suggest even more strongly that the targets, absorbed by other KVs, must have been quite attractive ones. Having been in a state of financial distress was definitely not an attractive target characteristic. First, the higher both the ratio of young established contributors to old contributors and the entrepreneurs' financing share in total claims costs were, the more likely it is that a KV was absorbed; the effects were much higher than those supporting the 'rescue' hypothesis. Second, the more diversified a KV was over mining subsectors, the higher was the hazard of absorption.
Beyond that, the additional statistical evidence on liquidations does support the 'selfinterest' hypothesis, too. In the presence of the alternative, 'being merged into another KV,'
KVs exhibiting a bad age structure-indicating recruitment problems-and a smaller or a diminishing size were liquidated. This implies that those KVs were not attractive enough to be rescued by absorption. Hence, the concentration process of the Prussian miners' social insurance funds was, indeed, a selection process of sorting out unsound funds, but not a process driven by acts of solidarity.
